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Anthropologists commonly define their discipline, anthropology, as the study of anthropos (humankind) and think it perfectly natural to pay little or no attention to the nonhuman realm of animalkind. Of course, animals do figure in anthropological studies but they do so mainly as raw material for human acts and human thought.
Anthropology has a long tradition of studying the ways in which human groups and cultures deal with and conceive of their natural environment, including other species. Such studies usually confine themselves to humans in their capacities as agents and subjects who act upon and think about animals.
Consequently, animals tend to be portrayed as passive objects that are dealt with and thought and felt about. Far from being considered agents or subjects in their own right, the animals themselves are virtually overlooked by anthropologists. They and their relations with humans tend to be considered unworthy of anthropological interest. Most anthropologists would think it perfectly natural to pay little or no attention to the way things look, smell, feel, taste or sound to the animals involved. Consequently, questions pertaining to animal welfare in the West or in the Third World rarely figure in anthropological thought.
Anthropologists treat animals as integral parts of human economic constellations and human-centered ecosystems: They are economic resources, commodities and means of production for human use. When challenged on this issue most anthropologists argue that for questions about animals per se one had better turn to sciences such as biology or ethology. To point out to them that in addition to a human-animal relationship there also exists something like an animal-hwnan relationship, and that totally ignoring the latter will lead to a one-sided subject-object approach is a waste of time. As present the anthropocentrism in anthropology goes virtually unchallenged.
Understanding Anthropology's Anthropocentrism
The reason for this is the commonly held view that animals in themselves have nothing to offer a science which is concerned with the social and the cultural.
Anthropologists and sociologists as well as scholars in the humanities generally assume that sociality and culture do not exist outside the human realm. These phenomena are taken to be exclusively human, a view which lands anthropologists and their colleagues in the circular argument that animals, not being human, cannot possibly be social or cultural beings. Social scientists characterize humans in terms of the material and social arrangements these humans make and by which they are also shaped: as beings who socially constitute and are constituted. Humans are taken to make their own history and while their natural history was once believed to be made for them, modem humanity increasingly tries to shape that history as well. By contrast, animals are believed to have only a natural history, which is made for them and which has caused them to evolve in the first place.
Unlike human beings, animals tend to be regarded as organisms primarily governed by their individually-based genetic constitutions. But this conviction turns out to be an a priori one, given the circumstance that almost no student of human society and culture asks the same questions about animals as are asked about humans. One does not look for the social and the cultural where surely it cannot be found, outside the human sphere! However, if one preconceives humans to be the sole beings capable of creating society, culture and language, one excludes animal forms of society, culture and language by definition. On the whole, animals figure in anthropology not only as objects for human subjects to act upon but also as antitheses of all that according to the social sciences makes humans human. The social sciences present themselves pre-eminently as the sciences of discontinuity between humans and animals.
There are few social scientists willing to ask what animal-human continuity might mean in terms of their own field. Thus sociologists do not bother about a sociology of animals. Neither do most social scientists question the common hierarchical subject-object approach to the human-animal relationship; least of all do they pose questions as to the ways in which animal subjects might relate to human subjects. Social scientists tend to treat our continuity with animals as a purely material residue from a prehistorical past. At the most our "animalness" (our body) is taken to have formed the material base upon which our real "humanness" (mind, sociality, culture, language) could arise. Our humanness is built on an animal basis of sorts, with a vital addition.
Biological Essentialism: For Animals only
At the same time social scientists tend to be on their guard against any form of biological essentialism. They hasten to point out the dangers of explaining social differences between people in terms of biological essences such as race or sex (and rightly so).
Ironically, many scientists who hold this view still gravitate towards those essentialist positions they claim to detest -as soon as another biological category comes into view, our species barrier. In an earlier work (Noske, Humans and other Animals, 1989), I described the extent to which the social scientific image of animals and animalness has been shaped by sciences which are often denounced as reductionist and objectifying. Such reductionism is only denounced, however, when directed at human beings.
The natural sciences, particularly the biobehavioral sciences, are responsible for creating the current animal image. The biobehavioral scientific characterization of animals is presented in terms of observable traits and mechanisms thought to be This has led to an "anti-animal reaction" among scholars in the humanities.
They bluntly state that evolutionary theory is all right for the interpretation of animals and animal actions but not for humans. Hardly any critic of biological determinism will stop to think whether animals indeed can be understood in narrowly genetic and biological terms.
Many people in or allied with the social sciences err in accepting biology's s image of animals as the animal essence. They fail to appreciate that that image of animals is a de-animalized biological construct. The anthropocentric social sciences view their own subject matter, humans, as animal in basis plus a vital addition. This view turns animals automatically into reduced humans. The argument goes as follows: If biologists and ethologists are reductionists this is because animals, as reduced beings, prompt them to think so.
However, it may well be that animals continue to be objectified because biologists prefer to remain reductionist and because social scientists for their part prefer to remain anthropocentric.
Reexamining Human-Animal Continuity
Does the current image of animals really convey all there is to animals? Having rejected the caricatures reductionists have made of humans, why take their animal caricatures at face value?
To acknowledge human-animal continuity is not necessarily to indulge in biological reductionism (Noske, 1989) . Another obstacle to the recognition of human-animal continuity is the fear among biologists of being accused of anthropomorphism, the attribution of exclusively human characteristics to animals. There are some courageous animal scientists who do say that animals are more human-like and less object-like than their own science will have us believe.
However, they will often say such things off the record or rather apologetically. This is understandable since they are committing a sacrilege both from the perspective of the animal sciences and from that of the human sciences. Those scientists who have actually studied animals as participant observers, the common anthropological approach to human societies, reveal a tension in their writings between the accepted biological codes and their own experiences with animal personhood.
Jane Goodall who is working with chimpanzees, Dian Fossey who lived and died among mountain gorillas, the Douglas-Hamilton couple and Cynthia Moss who are living and working among elephants, all write about touching experiences with animal personhood. Their science cannot handle these forms of animal reality and tends to belittle or ignore them. The animal sciences are simply not equipped to deal with those characteristics in animals which according to the social sciences make humans human.
Faced with the shortcomings of their own tradition a number of dissatisfied animal scientists, such as Donna Haraway and Donald Griffin, have called for a tentative anthropological approach to animals. What attracts them in anthropology and particularly in its method of participant observation is its intersubjective, nonreductionist way of acquiring knowledge, a method contrasting strongly with the subject-object approach applied by animal scientists in their laboratories.
Anthropologists treat the Other with respect and are wary of ethnocentrism. Even though the Other cannot be fully known nor understood, anthropologists have been trained to tread upon this unknowable ground with respect rather than with disdain.
But all this pertains only to the human Other. It is curious that scientists who have learned to beware of the dangers of ethnocentrism so easily lapse into another kind of centrismanthropocentrism.
We are sadly stuck with two seemingly unrelated images: one of humankind and one of animalkind conveyed by two totally separate brands of science, the one typifying humans as social subjects, the other typifying animals as biological objects. The newly emerging discipline of human-animal relations will find this a formidable obstacle to overcome. 
